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Frères ennemis? Relations between
Panjabi Sikhs and Muslims in the
Diaspora
Christine Moliner
1 In the expanding academic field of Sikh studies—in particular Sikh Diaspora studies—a
topic has been under-researched: the relations between Sikhs and non Sikhs.1 The issue of
the formation of a diasporic Sikh identity, as investigated in recent works, has focused on
the role of political mobilisation, on the production of visual representations of the Sikhs,
the process of cultural and religious transmission, the mediation of religious authorities
or the internal diversity of the community along caste or sectarian lines2… But to try to
answer the seminal question of W.H. McLeod ‘Who is a Sikh?’ (from the title of his book,
1989), my contention is that one has also to explore Sikh constructions of alterity and
representations of the other(s), as essential component of identity.
2 Why study Sikhs’ representations of the Muslims? Following the partition of British India,
the partition of the Panjab province, where they originate from, has resulted in 1947 in a
huge exchange of population: Sikhs and Hindus fled to East (Indian) Panjab and Muslims
to  West  (Pakistani)  Panjab.  The  starting  point  of  this  study  is  thus  to  investigate  if
Panjabis,  since  they  could  not  ‘meet’  (literally  and  metaphorically)  until  recently  in
partitioned South Asia, have managed to do so in their diasporic homes. Since I have been
studying so far Sikh diasporic identity formation, I have chosen to focus only on Sikhs’
representations,  but  this  work should be completed by a  reversed study of  Muslims’
perceptions about Sikhs. This would definitely help balance a point of view that might
otherwise be considered as biased against Sikhs.
3 The  conceptual  framework  of  this  study  revolves  around  the  notion  of  identity
narratives, as defined by D.-C. Martin, particularly the role of otherness in fashioning
identity. Indeed, ‘identities implies the other to exist and develop; identity narrative (…)
is as much a statement on the other, or the others, as a proclamation of oneself’ (Martin
1995). Moreover, in this volume, Gayer reminds us that diasporic constructions of the
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other(s) are remarkable for their multiplicity and their instability. As far as diasporic
Sikhs are concerned, Muslims, Hindus as well as also other ethnic minorities and the
majority population,  the British,  are potentially all  powerful  figures of  otherness.  All
instable though, as they depend on complex interactions between the global context,
national (partition legacy, relations between India and Pakistan, British policy towards
ethnic minorities) and even local ones (patterns of community relations differ in Southall,
Birmingham or Bradford). My study of Sikh representations of the Muslims will unfold in
two parts: how the Muslim has historically been constructed as a powerful symbol of
otherness in Sikh identity narratives and how this has impacted on contemporary inter-
ethnic relations in the UK.
 
Figure of the Other in Sikh historic and religious
corpus
4 Sikh religious corpus offers an apt starting point to understand how the Muslim has been
historically  constructed  as  the  Other  in  Sikh  imaginary.  Indeed,  Sikh  religious  and
historical texts are replete with references to Muslims, Mughals and Afghans but these
references convey heterogeneous, equivocal, sometimes contradictory representations, in
any case far more complex than implied by later interpretations. Two opposite themes
run across this literature: one that insists on the fraternity (bhaichara) between Sikhs and
Muslims, the other highlighting a supposed hereditary antagonism between them.
 
Bhaichara paradigm
5 As shown in H.  McLeod’s  authoritative translation and study of  Sikh textual  sources
(1984), there are no representations of the Muslim (or the Hindu) as the Other in Sikh
major scriptures, such as the Adi Granth or the Dasam Granth. And this very absence
upholds McLeod’s contention about there being no fixed religious boundaries in early
Sikhism.
6 The references to Hindus and Muslims convey one message: that of the unity of mankind
under one God. But this fundamental truth is concealed by meaningless doctrines and
rituals, which artificially divide mankind. One of the most forceful expressions of this
irenic belief is to be found in a famous passage of the Dasam Granth:
Some are  called  Hindus,  others  are  Muslims,  members  of  sects  such as  Shia  or
Sunni. 
Let it be known that mankind is one, that all men belong to a single humanity.
So too with God, whom Hindu and Muslim distinguish with differing names. 
Let none be misled, for God is but one; he who denies this is duped and deluded.
There is no difference between a temple and a mosque, nor between the prayers of
a Hindu or a Muslim. 
Though differences seem to mark and distinguish, all men in reality are the same.
Gods and demons, celestial beings, men called Muslims and others called Hindus-
such differences are trivial,  inconsequential,  the outward results  of  locality  and
dress.
Allah is  the same as the God of  the Hindus,  Puran and Qur’an are one and the
same… (Dasam Granth, Akal Ustat, in McLeod’s translation 1987: 57).
7 When Guru Nanak criticises conventional religions, he is targeting the two symbols of
religious  orthodoxy  of  his  time,  the  pandit  and  the  maulvi.3 This condemnation  of
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orthodoxy,  of  a  ritualistic  and outward observance of  religion,  is  typical  of the Sant
tradition from which early Sikhism has emerged in the 15th century. Besides this critique
of external devotion, the motive of ‘Baba Nanak the Unifier’ comes out strongly in the
Janam-Sakhi literature4 (hagiographies of Guru Nanak). He is repeatedly represented as a
conciliator between Hindus and Muslims, from his birth—solemnised by local Muslims
and Hindus—to his death—when his corpse is claimed by both communities, the former
asking to bury him, the latter to cremate him. Always accompanied by his two disciples,
Bala the Hindu and Mardana the Muslim, Guru Nanak as described in the Janam-Sakhi
tradition is mixing symbols, customs and even garments belonging to the two religious
affiliations.
8 This irenic representation of Guru Nanak has gained momentum in the course of Sikh
history  and  is  today  appropriated  by  those  advocating  for  tolerance  and  better
understanding between Sikhs and Muslims. This interpretation is developed by Yoginder
Sikand, in particular in his text ‘Re-imagining Sikh-Muslim relations in the light of the
life of Baba Nanak’ or his interview of Makhdoom Syed Chan Pir Qadri on Sikh-Muslim
relations, where the Pir emphasizes the close spiritual relationship between some Sikh
Gurus and the Sufis (the Pir himself is custodian of the dargah of the famous Qadiri Sufi
Mian Mir from Lahore who laid the foundation stone of  the Harmandir Sahib at  the
request of the fifth Sikh Guru).
 
The antagonist paradigm
9 All these religious and historical elements attesting a non-conflictual co-existence and
shared religious practices between Muslims and Sikhs have been completely marginalised
from the 18th century onwards, in the process of Sikh identity formation that entailed the
construction of rigid boundaries between Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus and in particular the
elaboration of Sikh representations of the ‘Musulman’ as the dangerous other.
10 These representations are grounded in a specific corpus, both liturgical and historical:
the Rahitnamas (‘Books of code’), the Gurbilas (‘Glory of the Guru’) and the martyrologies
of the late 19th—early 20th century socio-religious reform movement called the Singh
Sabha (‘Society of the Lions’). In this type of literature, the creation of the Khalsa5 in 1699
appears as the rupture point in the history of the Panth. One should here distinguish
between the historical event itself and the ways it has later been interpreted: the later
only will be of interest for our purpose. Sikh traditional historiography, a product of the
Singh Sabha reform movement, sees the creation of the Khalsa order as a response by the
10th Guru to Mughal oppression. According to tradition, Guru Gobind Singh wanted to
transform his peaceful disciples into valiant soldiers able to overthrow Mughal power, to
transform sheep into lions (Singh). This spectacular transformation was to be achieved
through a distinctive initiation ceremony (khande di pahul), to impart them with a martial
spirit, a sense of sacrifice for the sake of righteousness and through a rigorous code of
conduct  (Khalsa  Rahit)  to  fashion  a  separate  and  visible  identity,  and  to  make  it
impossible for Singhs to conceal themselves in the face of the oppressor.
11 The Rahitnamas, those manuals recording the Rahit, prescribe ritual practices and social
obligations, some of which are illustrative of a growing sense of the Muslim as the other.
The  Chaupa  Singh  Rahit  Nama,  studied  and  translated  by  McLeod  (1987),  illustrates
explicitly this anti-muslim theme grounded in the 18th century tense context, through the
following list of prohibitions:
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Never associate with a Muslim nor trust his word.
Never drink water from a Muslim’s hands, never eat his food,
And never sleep in his company.
Do not be influenced by anything which a Muslim may say,
Never touch a Muslim woman.
Never eat meat from animals killed according to Muslim rites (…)
12 Hence the Rahit Maryada (the modern form of the Rahit) strictly prohibits for amritdhari
Sikhs  (lit.  those  who  took  the  baptismal  nectar  called  amrit,  during  the  initiation
ceremony) four kurahit (lit. ‘bad rules of behaviour’): cutting one’s hair, eating halal meat,
having extra marital sexual intercourse, smoking tobacco. While at least two of those
practices (halal meat and tobacco) are clearly associated with Muslims, in the case of the
third kurahit, it is more covert. If we are to follow McLeod’s analysis, this kurahit is the
contemporary rendition of an older one, prohibiting intercourse with Muslim women.
13 The  Gurbilas  and  the  Singh  Sabha  martyrologies  also  bear  the  imprint  of  the
confrontation with the Mughals and contributed greatly to the conflictual narrative that
permeates,  even till  today,  Sikh collective  imaginary,  whereas  the  bhaichara one  has
remained at the periphery.
This rhetoric of confrontation is articulated around what Veena Das calls the ‘Hindu-
Sikh-Muslim triad’ (Das 1992), where the Sikh plays the martyr, the Muslim the oppressor
and the Hindu a more ambiguous role, either victim or traitor, at best an unreliable ally
of  the  Sikh  against  the  Muslim.  The  martyrdom  of  the  ninth  Guru,  Tegh  Bahadur,
exemplifies these complex relations.
14 Before that, the death of the fifth Guru in 1606 under the orders of Emperor Jahangir
dramatically initiated a new phase in Sikh history, marked by the hostility of Mughal
administration and the ensuing shift of the Sikhs from a quietist community to a martial
one. Thirty years later the conflict had become even more acute between the Sikhs and
the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, who figures prominently in Sikh demonology, depicted
as a tyrant, a fanatical Muslim willing to convert to Islam the whole of India. Kashmiri
Brahmins, threatened of forced conversion by Aurangzeb, appealed to Guru Teg Bahadur
for help. The Guru’s challenge to Aurangzeb, ‘If you manage to convert me, then all non-
Muslims will also embrace Islam’, lead to his decapitation in November 1675 in Delhi.
15 Let’s examine the multiple interpretations of this critical event in Sikh history. According
to traditional Sikh historiography, the conflict was a religious one, opposing a fanatical
Muslim tyrant and the Sikh Guru,  ready to sacrifice his life for the sake of  religious
freedom, in that particular instance of a community other than his own. This last point is
important in Sikhs perception of themselves as defenders of the weak and the oppressed.
Muslims  have  a  completely  different  reading  of  the  period:  the  conflict  between
Aurangzeb and the Guru was politically motivated, as the Sikhs were posing a threat to
Mughal  power.  The  Arya  Samaj  and  Hindu  nationalists  propose  yet  another
interpretation:  the  Guru  died  to  protect  his  own  dharma,  and  that  interpretation
underscores their reinterpretation of Sikhism as the sword arm of Hinduism against a
common enemy, the Muslim.
16 The polysemic aspect of the event should not distract us however from the fact that only
the first interpretation is regarded as the accurate one among Sikhs. Sikh traditional
understanding of this event is archetypal of the triad mentioned above, Aurangzeb as the
oppressor,  the  Kashmiri  Brahmins  as  the  victims  (but  also  as  the  taunts,  in  some
accounts) and the Guru as the martyr. At the centre stands the martyrdom of Guru Tegh
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Bahadur. Here we touch upon the pre-eminent role of the martyr in Sikh history, what
Lou Fenech calls the rhetoric of martyrdom (2003) that is central to our analysis of Sikhs’
portrayal of their collective self and of the Muslim Other. I will develop this point below
when talking about the Singh Sabha.
17 The  Gurbilas  epitomize  this  anti-Islamic  theme  (Fenech  2003:  123-9).  They  are  18th
century hagiographical accounts of the sixth and tenth Sikh Gurus, highlighting their
military skills and courage, the martial ethos they wanted to impart on the Sikhs—an
approach  to  the  lives  of  the  Gurus  very  different  from  the  Janam  Sakhi  literature
mentioned above. As we can expect, the Muslim figures prominently, in this literature, as
the persecutor: to praise the heroism and self-sacrifice of the Sikhs, one needs a villain as
cruel and fiendish as possible. Without a tormentor, there is no martyr: the fiercer the
persecutions, the bigger the heroism of the martyr. In a teleological perspective, we can
even consider the Muslim as God’s instrument to reveal  to the Sikhs their collective
destiny—Raj Karega Khalsa, ‘the Khalsa shall rule’. Therefore, in Sikh historiography, the
18th century is a period of great hardship, of persecutions ( the two great holocausts ) in
the hands of a cruel enemy, but a golden age too, foretelling triumph and glory for the
Panth,6 symbolised by Ranjit Singh’s entry into Lahore in 1799.
18 If we turn now to Singh Sabha literature and its representations of the Muslim, we can at
first agree with Fenech’s statement that ‘the anti-Muslim bias characteristic of the 18th
century Sikh literature  was  not  as  pronounced in  the  literature  of  the  19th century’
(Fenech 2003: 10). Indeed some of the crudest components of the anti-Islam theme as
present in the Rahitnamas and the Gurbilas have been expurgated by the Singh Sabha
reformists. Hence, the Singh Sabha recasting of the Rahit, that was to ultimately lead to
the promulgation of the current Rahit Maryada in 1950, illustrates this euphemisation
trend. The Rahit Maryada is purged from any overtly anti-Muslim elements, such as the
prohibitions quoted above  from the  Chaupa Singh Rahit  Nama (see  for  instance  the
prohibition of sexual intercourse with a Muslim woman rephrased as ‘cohabiting with a
person other than one’s spouse’, SGPC 1997: chapter 13).
19 How can we explain this shift in Sikh discourse? Fenech refers to Sikh dominance of the
Panjab under Ranjit Singh and his displacement of Mughal rule as a possible explanation,
H. McLeod  to  the  influence  of  colonial  understanding  of  communal  relations,
deligitimizing  open  expressions  of  enmity  (Fenech  2003,  McLeod  1999).  But  most
crucially, the project of the Singh Sabha to redefine Sikh identity created a new figure of
Otherness,  the  Hindu.  The  Tat  Khalsa,  the  Singh Sabha  radical  wing  that  ultimately
gained prominence, wanted to demonstrate that the Sikhs are a separate community,
distinct from both Hindus and Muslims. Sikhs’ distinctiveness from Muslims didn’t need
much elaboration then, as the Muslim has routinely embodied the Other since the 18th
century.
20 The Singh Sabha primary concern was thus to demonstrate that Sikhs were not Hindus, as
illustrated in a famous pamphlet published in the late 19th century, Ham Hindu Nahin (‘We
are not Hindus’). As we can infer from its title, it was first written in Hindi7 and addressed
as much to Hindus as to Sikhs and since then it has become a classic proclamation of Sikh
identity as reinterpreted by the Singh Sabha of which Bhai Kahn Singh, its author, was an
eminent protagonist. It was released in a context of strong antagonism between the Tat
Khalsa and the Arya Samaj whom the former identified as the new enemy of the Panth.
Indeed, Sikhs resented very much the derogatory statements on the Sikh Gurus made by
Swami Dayananda,  the leader of  the Samaj,  and more generally opposed the Samaj’s
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contention that Sikhism is merely the militant branch of Hinduism (Jones 1973). This
antagonism  was  made  all  the  more  acute  by  the  conversion  issue.  Christian  mass
conversions, mostly of low castes and untouchables, led Hindu, Sikh and Muslim reform
movements into an aggressive and competitive proselytism, of which Panjab became the
privileged ground from the 1880s. It is noteworthy that the first Singh Sabha was set up in
Amritsar, in reaction to the conversion of Sikh students to Christianity in 1873.
21 It is also in the Panjab that the Arya Samaj developed its own ritual of conversion, shuddhi
, initially used to readmit Hindus who had converted to Islam or Christianity but then
extended to purify Hindu and Sikh untouchables (Jones 1976). Besides the Arya Samaj and
the Church, the Ahmeddyia were also prominent in these conversion activities, targeting
specifically Sikhs. But Arya activism was increasingly perceived by Sikh reformists as the
greatest  of  all  threats,  all  the  more  that  this  perception  found  an  echo  in  colonial
ideology. For instance, a recurring theme of British orientalism, that of Sikhism in danger
of  re-absorption into Hinduism, was re-appropriated by the Tat Khalsa and fed their
antagonism with the Arya Samaj. According to a famous phrase by Macauliffe:
Hinduism (…) is like the boa constrictor of the Indian forests. When a petty enemy
appears to worry it, it winds round its opponent, crushes it in its folds and finally
causes  it  to  disappear (…)  in  this  way it  is  disposing of  the reformed and once
hopeful religion of Baba Nanak (…) [that is] making a vigorous struggle for life, but
its ultimate destruction is inevitable without State support (Macauliffe 1909).
22 Sikhs hold the weakest position in the triad, since their quest for recognition of the Panth
as  the third Qaum was opposed not  only  by both Muslims and more strenuously  so
Hindus, but also within their own ranks.  At par with the Arya Samaj,  the Tat Khalsa
targeted  another  enemy,  all  the  more  dangerous  that  it  was  an  insider:  the  Sikhs’
‘ignorance’ about their true identity, misconstructed as part of Hinduism by Tat Khalsa
opponents, the Sanatan (traditional) Sikhs, prominent in the Amritsar Singh Sabha and
very  active  in  the  Arya  Samaj.  Within  a  complex  social  fabric  characterised,  in  19th
century Panjab, by the plurality, the flexibility and the interpenetration of communal
identities, the Singh Sabha reformers undertook to draw clear-cut boundaries between
Sikhs and other Panjabis, and to impose these boundaries on Sikhs and non-Sikhs alike. I
shall come now to the Singh Sabha usage of martyrdom, alluded to above, in establishing
the limits of this separate identity, as superbly analysed by Fenech (2003). This rhetoric of
martyrdom, to use his phrase, appears quite relevant to our present study as it entails a
specific construction of the Self as victim and of the Others as inimical figures.
23 What is the correlation between martyrdom and collective identity? Fenech demonstrates
how ‘martyrdom also deals with identity, and dramatically so (...) In his horrific death,
the Sikh martyr was made to resolutely proclaim the separate identity of the Sikh Panth’
(Fenech 2003: 19). To the point that ‘Sikh community comes together symbolically in the
martyr and is substantiated and made public through martyrdom’ (Fenech 2003: 22). To
understand this correlation, we have to come back to the heroic period of the Panth, the
18th century, as it is perceived by Sikhs since the Singh Sabha period. Let’s not forget that
according to Sikh tradition the Khalsa was created to resist Mughal attempt to annihilate
the Panth,  it  is  therefore in a situation of  conflict  with the Muslims that this  major
identity shift  occurred.  Sikhs were persecuted,  so the tradition goes,  by a tyrannical
enemy and resisted till death to uphold their faith. As the Arabic term shahid (widely used
by Sikhs since the 19th century to refer to their martyrs) implies, they were witnesses to
truth through the sacrifice of their life. It is particularly in defence of the visible symbols
of the faith—especially kesh,  the hair and the turban—that they were martyred. Their
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sacrifice became, in the hands of the Singh Sabha, a powerful tool firstly to promote
Khalsa identity and deligitimize non-Khalsa ones, and secondly to proclaim the separate
identity  of  the  Sikhs.  Their  martyrdom  rhetoric  therefore  consolidated  both  inner
boundaries (between Khalsa and non-Khalsa) and outer ones (between Sikhs and non-
Sikhs).
24 Interesting is also the reinterpretation of the past implied here. This is not specific to the
Singh Sabha, as their Muslim and Hindu counterparts have engaged in the same task. I
have already mentioned how some key events have given way to very different, often
contradictory, communal interpretations (see for instance the martyrdom of Guru Tegh
Bahadur or the reign of Ranjit Singh, hailed by the Sikhs, dreaded by the Muslims). I wish
now to underscore firstly how the Singh Sabha has fashioned Sikh history as the history
of martyrdom and secondly how it has established continuity, contemporaneity between
selected past events and the present.8 And this primacy of martyrdom and the continuity
between past and present are bearing, still  today, a strong imprint on Sikh collective
imaginary.
25 Sikh historiography indeed lies on a systematic forgetting of not-so-heroic incidents, and
a contrario, on a selection of events which portray the Panth in the best possible light.
Hence, Persian sources referring to Sikhs’ conversion to Islam are conveniently ignored,
so too the infighting or the looting characteristic of  the misl (warrior bands),  in the
second half  of  the 18th century (Fenech 2003:100).  Likewise Sikh participation in the
communal  riots  of  the  1920s  and  1940s  and  in  the  carnage  of  the  partition  is  not
acknowledged. As stated by Veena Das (1992), all acts of violence are constructed as the
violence of martyrdom, any evil acts being projected on the Other (Hindu or Muslim).
26 As for our second point, the contemporaneity between the past (a reconstructed one) and
the present, a correlation is consistently drawn between struggles, threats and enemies of
the past and those of the present. It is true at the turn of the 20th century, when the Arya
Samaj first and later, during the Gurdwara Reform Movement in the 1920s, the Mahants
(Hindu custodians of the Gurdwaras) are equated with the dreaded Afghans and Mughals
of the 18th century. It is also true in the 1980s, during the confrontation of Sikh neo-
fundamentalists with the central Indian State, perceived as a dominating and aggressive
Hindu entity, a confrontation projected as the continuation of a long series of struggles to
preserve Sikh identity.
27 The Sikh-Hindu-Muslim triad is therefore constantly renegotiated and submitted to an
evolving political context. Hence, the Singh Sabha concern to demonstrate that Sikhs are
not Hindus tended to euphemize the anti-Muslim theme and to identify the Hindu as the
new  enemy.  Likewise,  Veena  Das  shows  how  Muslim/Sikh  antagonism  has  been
neutralised in contemporary Sikh militant discourse.
28 But  it  is  my  contention  that  Sikh/Muslim  antinomy  remains  constitutive  of  Sikh
collective imaginary and surfaces therefore very easily. Hence, after a relatively peaceful
communal climate following the imposition of the Pax Britannica in Panjab in the second
half of the 19th century, the first half of the twentieth was a contrario characterised by an
increasingly  tense  and  conflictual  context,  marked  out  by  the  issue  of  a  separate
electorate  granted  to  Muslims  in  1909,  by  the  heightened  competition  between
communities  for  a  larger  share  of  political  representation  and  power,  and  by  the
launching  of  the  Pakistan  movement  by  the  Muslim League  in  the  early  1940s.  The
resulting communal riots of the 1920s and 1940s followed a well known pattern, with
Sikhs and Hindus allied against Muslims.
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29 I  would  like  to  illustrate  this  point  with  two  events,  of  very  unequal  historical
importance: the execution of Lachman Singh in 1909 and, in the few months preceding
partition,  Sikhs’  reactions  (particularly  those  of  the  Akalis)  to  the  Pakistan demand.
Fenech opens his analysis of the Singh Sabha rhetorical use of martyrdom with the story
of  Lachman Singh,  hanged in  June  1909  for  the  murder  of  three  Muslims,  who had
converted to Islam a Hindu lambadar (village chief) (Fenech 2003: 178-89). This seemingly
anecdotic event is in fact highly revealing. Let’s notice first that it occurred in the wake of
the  Morley-Minto  reforms,  granting,  as  mentioned  above,  separate  electorate  for
Muslims,  but  not  for  Sikhs,  despite  their  repeating  demands.  Secondly,  the  issue  of
conversion appears  as  central  in  Lachman Singh’s  act.  As  discussed above,  it  raised,
among  community  leaders,  fear  of  numerical  and  therefore  political  decline  and
increased communal competition and conflicts. And in the case of Sikhs, one cannot fail
to draw a parallel with the spectre of persecutions and forced conversions to Islam of the
18th century. Remarkably, Lachman Singh story follows the same pattern of the martyr-
victim-oppressor triangular relationship that I have already mentioned. Indeed, if we are
to  follow  Fenech’s  interpretation,  Lachman  Singh,  who  considered  himself  and  was
regarded  by  his  contemporaries  as  a  shahid,  was  most  probably  influenced  by  Sikh
martyrologies describing Sikh suffering under Mughal tyranny and depicting the Khalsa
as the protector of the Hindus.
30 The second example I wish to dwell on brings us some 35 years ahead, during the few
months preceding the partition of India. A period of great instability and uncertainty for
the Sikhs, who greatly objected to the creation of Pakistan then to the idea of partition,
and supported various  counter-schemes such as  Azad Panjab,  Sikhistan or  Khalistan,
opposed by both the Congress and the League.9 When it became clear that Pakistan would
finally be conceded by the British, but the shape and substance of it remained very vague,
the Akalis raised with an increasing vigour the spectre of a Muslim Raj, imposed on the
Sikh minority.  In a famous episode, their leader,  Master Tara Singh, came out of the
Panjab Assembly on 4th March 1947 shouting ‘Pakistan murdabad, Sat Sri Akal’ (death
onto Pakistan,  followed by the Sikh greeting)  and delivering an incensed speech:  ‘O,
Hindus and Sikhs! Your trials await you. Be ready for self-destruction like the Japs and
the Nazis (…). We crushed Mughlistan and we shall trample Pakistan (…)’(Talbot & Singh
1999: 142). Similar speeches were delivered by leaders of the three communities, equally
busy in preparing for civil war. The carefully nurtured memory of past conflicts played a
major part in the outburst of violence surrounding partition—and this is especially true
of Muslim-Sikh antagonism.
31 Among its most gruesome episodes figures the story of Thoa Khalsa,10 a West Panjabi
village  where  90  Sikh  women  committed  mass  suicide  not  to  fall  in  the  hands  of
thousands of armed Muslims surrounding them. In the accounts of survivors and in the
various  contemporary  accounts,  the  women  are  depicted  as  shahid,  faithful  to  ‘Sikh
tradition of courage and self-sacrifice’, hailed as ‘daughters of Guru Arjan’, equated with
18th century martyrs, ready to give their life to safeguard their honour, and by extension
that of their community (Butalia 1998, Pandey 2001).
32 In each community, the collective memory of such events has been kept alive, based on
the projection of all evil acts on the other side, and sanctified by the nationalist narrative
of the two newly created states. This partition of memory was all the easier in the case of
Panjab that partition of the territory led to an entire exchange of population, to the
extent that there are no Hindus and Sikhs left in West Panjab and hardly any Muslims in
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East Panjab (except for the former principality of Malherkotla and Qadian).11 Therefore, it
is  only  abroad  that  Sikh,  Hindu  and  Muslim  Panjabis  have  had  until  recently  the
opportunity to meet. But did they really meet in the diaspora? Here is the question I wish
now to address.
 
Reinvention of the two paradigms in a diasporic
context
33 I wish here to study how these representations of the Muslim ‘Other’, oscillating between
bhaichara and hereditary antagonism (the latter paradigm overpowering Sikh collective
imaginary),  are  transposed  in  a  diasporic  context;  how  they  influence  inter-ethnic
relations,  without entirely fashioning them, how in particular they interact  with the
specific socio-political context of the host society.
 
The British context
34 Let’s first consider the ideological and political context of post-war Britain in relation to
the mass-migration of its former colonial subjects. Sociologists have established a linkage
between colonial representations and policy vis a vis the various communities the British
ruled—in particular  their  role  in  fostering sharply defined communal  identities—and
British policy towards immigrants in post-colonial Britain. This policy, as it culminated in
the 1980s, deals with communities, not individuals as in France, defined primarily, in the
case  of  South  Asians,  in  terms  of  religious  affiliation.  It  has  more  specifically
institutionalized and legitimized the most conservative or orthodox definitions of these
identities.  This  has  had  several  consequences:  South  Asian  community  leaders  are
primarily religious leaders (specially so in the case of Sikhs and Muslims); religious-based
organisations have received the greatest share of public support and funding, they have
been more successful at mobilising immigrants than pan-Asian or pan-Indian ones and
they do so on religious issues (the turban of the Sikhs, the provision of halal meat in
school  for  Muslim children…).  In  short,  communities  are  encouraged  to  stress  their
cultural specificities, while competing for public resources and recognition, and in this
process minority identities tend to be reified and institutionalised.
35 In this competition, British Sikhs took the lead in the late 1950s. Their mobilisation for
the  right  to  wear  the  turban  (as  a  bus  driver,  then  on  a  motorcycle  or  in  school)
culminated in a House of Lords ruling of 1982, granting them the status of an ethnic
group.  This  specific  recognition allowed them to benefit  from the legislation against
discrimination (paradoxically defined on ethnic or racial grounds, not religious one) that
has been so far denied to Muslims. 
Emulating the Sikhs, British Muslims have from the early 1990s been prominent in this
‘race’  to  specific  provisions  so  much  so  that  other  communities,  specially  after  11
September 2001, sense that Muslims are been ‘pampered’ by British authorities (despite
abundant evidence of discrimination against them). British multicultural policy, although
officially striving for the opposite, has resulted in stiff competition between communities,
defined internally as homogenous and externally by rigid boundaries.
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Muslim/Sikh antagonism reinterpreted in Britain
36 I  wish firstly to allude to the methodological  aspects of  this  question:  how does one
investigate about constructions of otherness? I have encountered in my interviews the
same ‘censure on declared or open enmity’ (Baumann 1997: 22) with other communities
as noted by other observers (see Baumann 1997, Gayer in this volume). So much so that I
quickly decided to avoid direct questioning on the issue of relations with the Muslims.
But it popped in by the backdoor, so to say, and in that respect, the most interesting
information was definitely drawn from participant observation and informal interviews.
Community literature published by various British Sikh organisations and gurdwaras has
also been a valuable source.
37 I have identified three recurring themes in my interviews and in community literature:
the issue of proselytism, the status of women, and the prohibition of sexual relations
across communal boundaries. The first one, particularly prominent among Sikh students,
revolves  around  the  proselytism  of  Muslim  fellow  students  on  campuses.  Christian
proselytism is also resented, and Sikhs perceive themselves as easy prey to the allegedly
aggressive conversion activities of those two groups. The issue of conversion, discussed
above in the colonial context, is crucial in perceptions of the Self and the Other(s). Sikhs
impute proselytism to Christians and Muslims and despite the thousands of  Western
converts (the Gore Sikhs) claim that Sikhism is a non-proselytising religion. This results
in a sense of threat, a perceived weakness vis a vis aggressive and numerically dominant
Others.
38 The ensuing tensions to ‘protect’  one’s  faith are interpreted as re-enactment of  past
conflicts-  those  of  the  18th century  adding  to  those  of  the  twentieth  like  layers  of
antagonism. More specifically, the issue of forced conversions to Islam either under the
Mughals or during partition still weighs on Sikh collective representations of the Muslims
—hence I was told several times that ‘if it hadn’t been for the Sikh Gurus, the whole of
India  would be Muslim now’.  Notably,  in  the diaspora,  conflicting memories  are  not
imported  as  such  but  reinvented,  and  in  this  case,  reinforced  by  the  West  own
perceptions and fears about radical Islam— hence the influence of such external events as
the Iranian revolution, the Rushdie affair, the Islamic scarf issue, the 11th September or
the 7th July bombing on inter-community relations in Western host countries.
39 Two pamphlets illustrate vividly my point: A Challenge to Sikhism by G.S. Sidhu, published
in 1999 for the tricentennary celebrations of the Khalsa and Sikh Religion and Islam, A
Comparative Study, by the same author with Gurmukh Singh as co-author, published in
2001. Both these works belong to the expanding genre of educational and religious Sikh
literature written for the second and third generations of pardesi (Sikhs settled abroad).
In this case written and published in the UK, the two pamphlets strive to alert ‘young
educated Sikhs’ to the ‘ill-intentioned attempts to misrepresent Sikh ideology and (…)
history’,  to  teach  them how ‘these  overt  and  covert  attacks  on  Sikhism (...)  can  be
repulsed’ (Introduction to A Challenge to Sikhism). Where do these attacks originate from?
‘Extracts from Muslim publications in the last part of this book show the one-sided nature
of these attacks of a highly inflammatory nature’ (Idem), whereas the foreword to the
second  booklet  points  at  the  ‘systematic  misrepresentation  of  both  Sikhism,  and
importantly, the high ideals of Islam, by some zealous Muslims, particularly in schools
and university campuses’. At the core of these distortions lies the figure of Guru Nanak,
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whose ‘indisputable position as a socio-religious revolutionary’ (Introduction to Challenge)
and founder of a world religion is constantly denied by some Muslims quarters. So at
stake is the demonstration of the true nature of Sikhism as a separate religion.
40 The arguments are not new—these works and the genre as the whole owe much to Singh
Sabha rhetoric—and they draw on earlier controversies. But interestingly, they are also
the product of international migration, of the encounter of Sikhs and Muslims in the West
and  are  fashioned  by  British  multicultural  context,  more  specifically  by  the  well
established  practice  of  interfaith  dialogue,  in  which  Sikhs  (mainly  through the  Sikh
Missionary  Society,  based  in  Southall)  have  been  quite  active.  The  foreword  to  Sikh
Religion and Islam highlights  the importance of  interfaith dialogue in such a pluralist
society  as  contemporary  Britain,  and  its  difficulties  too,  as  ‘some  religions,  notably,
Christianity and Islam, have missionary zeal’.  As a compilation of the correspondence
exchanged over several months between the author, a member of the Sikh Missionary
Society, and a Panjabi Muslim he had sympathised with at inter-faith meetings in the
South of England, A Challenge to Sikhism appears as a failed attempt at interfaith dialogue.
Letters  from the  Muslim correspondent  to  G.S.  Sidhu are  indeed very  offending,  his
repeated attempts to prove the superiority of Islam over Sikhism understandably upset
the author, and fall rather short of a true spirit of dialogue. G.S. Sidhu’s stand appears as
an interesting mixture of traditional Sikh scholarship (in the line of the Singh Sabha)
with a genuine attempt at dialogue and the usual representations of the Muslim as the
dangerous Other, framed in a diasporic context.
41 The second topic  I  have come across  relates  to the comparative status of  women in
Sikhism and Islam. Sikhs endo-definitions being antonymous with their perceptions of
the Muslims, Sikhism is defined as an egalitarian religion, encouraging the participation
of women in the religious and social domains, banning discrimination against women,
discouraging the practice of purdah. Their understanding of the status of women in Islam
revolves around a cluster of practices seen as emblematic: polygamy, veiling of women,
divorce by triple talaq, two women being equal to one man as witness. A brochure edited
by the Sikh Woman’s Awareness Network Islam and Sikhism: a Comparative View on Women
(published by the Akaal Purkh KI Fauj UK, in 1998) develops in a moderate form this
theme,  under  the  following  headings:  salvation;  education;  hereditary  rights;  gender
equality;  importance  of  woman’s  view;  opportunity  to  pray;  restrictions  on  clothes;
menstruation;  marriage.  The  text  deals  with  this  topic  exclusively  through  lengthy
quotations from the Quran and the Guru Granth Sahib. This purely textual and normative
approach allows for a maximum of differentiation between the two religious traditions. It
also conveniently leaves aside the question of actual religious and social practices, shared
by Sikhs and Muslims, and in fact by all Panjabis.
42 Thirdly, the issue of exogamous relationships is potentially the most conflictual one. It
evinces  in  both  communities  a  complex  array  of  collective  emotions,  fantasies  and
representations, fed by traumatic past events and reconfigured in Britain. Endogamous
marriage remains the norm among South Asians in Britain,  and exogamy difficult  to
accept, particularly by the girl’s family and community. In South Asia, women are the
repository of  the community’s  izzat  (honour),  hence potentially the instrument of  its
defilement. Their male relatives have therefore the responsibility to enforce community
norms, and impose ‘appropriate’ behaviour. This patriarchal control of women, of their
body and their sexuality, usually understood with reference to ‘traditional values’, is in
fact  a  by-product  of  transnational  migration  and  fits  in  a  complex  set  of  relations
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between ethnicity,  gender  and class  and in  particular  relates  to  social  constructs  of
masculinities of marginalised groups.12
43 The prohibition of  relationships outside one’s  community is  therefore not specific  to
Sikhs, but it takes on a specific shape when involving Muslims. The issue of ‘our girls’
being taken away by Muslims’, a regular feature in my informal interviews and in various
forums and chats on the net, is sensitive and potentially conflictual because of its close
relation to the first point of my argument, the fear of (forced) conversion, and indirectly
to the second, the status of women. In this kind of narratives, Sikh girls are considered as
easy prey for Muslim boys: because of the equal status granted to them by Sikhism, they
are allowed to mix much more freely with men; some Muslim men, finding it too difficult
and  dangerous  to  engage  in  a  relation  with  a  girl  from their  own  community,  will
therefore ‘target’ Sikh girls, who incidentally happen to be particularly beautiful (so the
contention goes...).  These boys are supposedly motivated by religious extremism and
their will to convert the Sikhs to Islam. In South Asia, conversion of a woman, following
her marriage, leads to that of her children, who then belong to the father’s family and
community. As in the case of exogamous relationships, the community of the girl feels its
integrity, its izzat threatened.
44 These social constructs conjure up the spectre of partition, of the mass-rapes, abductions
and forced conversions of women, perceived as a national shame (on the South Asian
notion of sharam,  see S.  Rushdie‘s Shame).  To illustrate my point,  I  shall  refer to the
protest that met the proposed release of a Pakistani film in the UK in November 2003.
Larki  Panjaaban (a Panjabi  girl)  tells  the story of a Sikh girl  from India who while in
Pakistan with her family to visit Sikh shrines falls in love with a Pakistani boy. Her family
when discovering this  relationship sends  her  to  Malaysia,  where  her  Pakistani  lover
manages to meet her and finally marry her. In the original script, she converts to Islam,
and soon after it is found that after all she was originally a Muslim who had been brought
up by Sikhs. The film was widely publicized as the first Lollywood (from the Lahore-based
film industry) ‘cross-border love story’ and symbolically was due to be released at the
same time in India, Pakistan and England. Interestingly, some British Sikhs (mostly from
the Muslim-Sikh Federation)  greatly  objected to  the  conversion bit  of  the  story  and
successfully put pressure on the film director, based in Bradford, to alter the script so
that the girl remained Sikh.
 
Commonalities and transcending of religious and national
cleavages: between South Asian identity and Panjabyat
45 However,  British  Sikhs  and  Muslims  share  a  common  migration  experience.  They
migrated predominantly  from rural  areas  to  post-industrial  Britain as  a  replacement
workforce, much needed in a post-war reconstruction economy. They belong to dominant
rural castes (the Jats), and originate from delimited areas, mainly from the Doaba (the
central districts of East Panjab) in the case of Sikhs,  from Mirpur (in Azad Kashmir),
Faisalabad and Jhelum districts (in West Panjab) in that of Muslims.
46 Their migration history and patterns of settlement are also quite similar. Involved in a
process of  chain migration,  the pioneers relied on the biradari (clan)  to settle  down.
Concentrated in the same regions, mostly Greater London and the Midlands, in the same
inner cities  areas,  they were at  first  engaged in the same occupations.  But after the
pioneering phase of migration, a process of differentiation started in the early 1970s:
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Sikhs called their family earlier; with the arrival of East African Sikhs, they also moved
away  from  industrial,  non-qualified  employment  into  self-employment  and  the
professions. This shift explains why they suffered much less than Pakistanis from the
acute industrial crisis of the 1970s. This differentiation has resulted in a much better
socio-economic  profile  for  Indians  as  a  whole  as  compared  to  Pakistanis  and
Bangladeshis. According to the 2001 census, Sikhs in Britain amount to 450,000 (out of a
total of 1 million Indians) and Pakistanis to 750,000.
47 Among the second and third generation, a South Asian identity has emerged forcefully,
that  transcends  religious,  ethnic  or  national  boundaries.  As  is  the  case  with  most
minority identity constructions, the South Asian (or Asian) label is in Britain as much an
ascribed as an asserted one. Indeed, British Asian ‘identity’, as experienced especially by
the youth, is a product of racism, and of their reactions to it. But besides this reactive
aspect,  there is a positive identification to this category among the second and third
generation,  based  on  the  socio-economic  commonalities  alluded  to  above,  on  the
rejection of the cleavages of the parent generation, seen as irrelevant in Britain and on
the  perception  of  cultural  similarities.  These  cultural  similarities  (food,  dress,  social
norms...) are given a new transnational dimension by the commoditisation and diffusion
of a diasporic culture, through the media of cinema, television and music.
48 Within  this  large  South  Asian  category  there  co-exist  several  narrower  types  of
identification that nonetheless cut across the national/religious divide. One of the most
powerful ones is Panjabyat.  This term of recent coinage, roughly translated as Panjabi
identity,  refers to the cultural  heritage,  the social  practices,  the values shared by all
Panjabis, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, Indians, Pakistanis, and increasingly the diaspora. It
is heavily loaded with nostalgia for pre-partition undivided Panjab, idealized as a unique
space of communal harmony. Its usage tends to be restricted to intellectual,  literary,
academic or media circles, and although these valorize popular culture in their definition
of Panjabyat, the term is not much used by the people.
49 It has broadly two acceptations: the loosest one, the most widespread too, especially in
the media, refers to its cultural components; the other one has a political content. The
issue of language serves as a bridge between cultural and political definitions. In both
senses, partition is the critical event, an incomprehensible aberration, a terrible blow to
Panjabis and Panjabyat struck variably by the British, the Muslim League or the Congress.
Let’s examine first the political definition of Panjabyat. For its proponents on both sides of
the border, India and Pakistan were created at the cost of a united Panjab, and since then
the two nation-states have suppressed Panjabi cultural and political identity, within a
centralised  political  framework.  Beyond  these  common  roots  and  their  antagonist
relations to the Nation-State, Panjabi nationalist movements have taken very different
shapes on each side, reflecting in a way the different position occupied by West Panjab in
Pakistan and East Panjab in India. In Pakistan, the overall domination of Panjabis in the
army, the bureaucracy and the economy elicits, since the creation of the country, the
hostility  of  the  three  other  Provinces,  and  their  accusation  of  a  ‘Panjabisation’  of
Pakistan. But this domination has been achieved at the cost of Panjabyat, subsumed into
Pakistani  national  identity,  through in particular  the  imposition of  Urdu as  national
language. Hence, (West) Panjabi nationalists’ agenda focuses on the issue of language, as
their  main demand is  the  use  of  Panjabi  in  schools,  administration and in  the  local
parliament  of  West  Panjab.13 In  India,  Panjabis  are  a  tiny  minority  of  the  overall
population (although their share in the economic sector and the army far exceeds their
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demographic weight) and Indian Panjab lies at the periphery of decision making process,
both political and economic. Secondly, in India, Panjabyat, in the political and cultural
sense, has been the preserve of one religious community, the Sikhs, Panjabi nationalism
meaning in fact Sikh nationalism, Panjabyat equating with Sikh identity. And Sikh ethno-
nationalism has been fashioned since independence by its opposition with the central
government, by a sense of alienation, of being discriminated as a minority. Although this
confrontation with Delhi has been a long-standing component of Panjabyat (much before
independence), it has taken a new form with the rise of Sikh separatism (the demand for
Khalistan), and the equation of the central government with the Hindu majority. Besides,
in their conflict with the Indian State, it is notorious that Khalistanis have secured some
kind of support from Pakistan, thus reconfiguring in a new way the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh
triad that we have discussed above.
50 The most current use of Panjabyat refers to its cultural components. Panjabi language is
clearly  the  most  important  binding  element.  Within  patterns  of  code  switching,
characteristic of most migrants and reinforced by the specific relations of Panjabi to Urdu
and Hindi (see below), Panjabi is preferred to convey intimate matters, emotions and
jokes. Panjabi is also the medium of a literature, a vernacular corpus of epic poems, folk
tales,  ballads and songs that has fashioned a common imaginary, spiritual values and
social practices and whose most popular figures are Waris Shah and Baba Farid.
51 Promotion of the language and of the literature has been the focus of diasporic Panjabi
circles, composed of writers, intellectuals, teachers, some of whom were educated in pre-
partition Panjab, others,  among the youngest partaking of this common British Asian
identity that I have mentioned. The World Panjabi Congress, created by Fakhar Zhaman
in Lahore, with most of its members in the diaspora, has been the herald of Panjabyat for
the  past  20  years,  and  remarkably  one  where  Panjabi  Muslims  are  significantly
represented,  which is  not  the  case  in  most  organisations.  The  Association of  Panjab
Studies, former editor of the International Journal of Punjab Studies, is a rare example in
the academic field that provided research on the ‘three Panjab’, pre-partition, East/West
Panjab and the diaspora- although the Sikh / East Panjab component was dominant. The
Panjabi Bulletin, edited by a young Sikh from Birmingham, focused on the promotion and
preservation of Panjabi folk music, in danger of disappearing both in Panjab and in the
diaspora, with the success of commercial music (bhangra).
52 Let’s return to the other cultural components of Panjabyat, to what I have called a Panjabi
ethos. To avoid any essentialist slip in my argument, I wish to stress that if there is such a
thing as  a  Panjabi  ethos,  it  is  of  course not  a  fixed,  objective category,  but  partly a
product  of  representations  and  stereotypes  fashioned  by  others.  Hence  Panjabis’
Epicureanism  (their  unrestricted  love  for  food,  drink  and  festivities),  their  open-
mindedness, their sense of hospitality, their romanticism and their anti-intellectualism,
as is conspicuous in sardar jokes (jokes about Sikhs) already appear as inscribed, ‘inbred’
characteristics in colonial literature (see the enduring legacy of the martial races theory).
This  aspect  of  Panjabyat has  been  widely  popularised  and  given  an  ‘hype  touch’  by
commercial  music (bhangra,  specially)  and movie (the archetype being the Bollywood
film, Veer Zara, herald of a marketed Panjabyat).
53 However, major  ambiguities  weaken also  Panjabyat as  a  potential  pan-ethnic  type  of
identification in the diaspora. Firstly,  the issue of language is not as consensual as it
seems.  I  have termed it  as  the strongest  bond,  it  is  also a divisive one,  through the
differentiation between spoken and written language along religious lines. Panjabi has
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three scripts: Persian, Devanagari and Gurmukhi, the sacred language of the Sikhs, the
only script specific to Panjabi, whereas the others are used by Urdu for Persian script and
Hindi for Devanagari script. Historically the high language, the language of culture and
power of  North India,  including Panjab,  was Persian,  then Urdu.  In the pre-partition
period, Urdu and English would be taught at school and Panjabi spoken at home, so that
only  Sikhs  would  learn  written  Panjabi  in  Gurmukhi  script  in  the  gurdwara.  These
language patterns have consolidated religious boundaries (Rahman 2003). After partition,
the  cleavage  between  scripts  and  oral  language  along  religious  affiliation  has  been
reinforced by the national divide, Urdu becoming the national language of Pakistan and
Hindi that of India.
54 These linguistic patterns have been replicated in the diaspora, so that although spoken at
home by all Panjabis, Panjabi is written, read and studied only by Sikhs. Hence, they alone
demanded in the late 1990s a better share for Panjabi on BBC radio programs on the basis
that Panjabi was the mother-tongue of the majority of British South Asians. This situation
is reminiscent of the pre-partition period and of the Panjabi Suba campaign in the 1950s,
when Panjabi Hindus declared Hindi, instead of Panjabi, as their mother tongue. As a
result, Panjabi language and Panjabyat tend to equate in the diaspora as in India with
Sikhs,  and very little space is  left  for,  or as a matter of  fact  claimed by Hindus and
Muslims.
55 Another  weakness  lies  in  the  way the  Hindu-Muslim-Sikh triad is  been reconfigured
within the framework of Panjabyat.  Most non-Panjabi Indians resent Panjabyat as anti-
Indian  and  anti-Hindu.  Indeed  they  rightly  point  at  the  involvement  of  former
Khalistanis,  with  well  established  links  with  the  Pakistan  government,  in  Panjabi
organisations (such as the World Muslim Sikh Federation, founded in the UK). Beyond
these  political  underpinnings,  it  seems  the  triad,  as  an  unstable  and unequal  set  of
relations, can only operate at the advantage of a pair and at the cost of a third party. And
in the current definition of Panjabyat, Hindus are the third party.
56 But despite these ambiguities, Panjabyat is been given a new vigour by the improvement
of relations between India and Pakistan, of which East and West Panjabi civil societies,
through people to people contact, have become major actors. The reopening of borders
since 2004 has resulted in a spectacular increase and diversification of exchanges across
Wagah border (peace marches, theatre and music tours, cricket tours, and pilgrimages...)
to an extent unknown since partition (Blom & Moliner 2005). It will be interesting to
follow their influence on community relations within the diaspora, and in particular in
improving relations between Muslims and Sikhs.
 
Conclusion
57 Relationships  between  minority  groups  in  a  migration  context  are  fashioned  by  a
complex combination of  variables.  In the case of  Sikhs and Muslims,  representations
borrowed  from  a  partly  reconstructed  past  are  certainly  predominant.  The  process
through which the Muslim came to stand as the dangerous Other for Sikhs started as
early as the 18th century, but what weigh the most on relations between the two groups
are the events of partition and their crystallisation in each community’s memory and
narrative.  But neither ‘hereditary’  enmity nor collective memory are immutable.  The
legacy of partition is being reassessed in South Asia: first by scholars and social activists,
now with the relative improvement of Indo-Pakistan relations, by civil society at large,
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even by the film industry (see the recent adaptation of Amrita Pritam’s novel Pinjar). In
the  diaspora,  particularly  for  the  youth,  the  borders  and  cleavages  inherited  from
partition are increasingly meaningless, and are being superseded by a common South
Asian identity, produced by migration, or more regional ones (such as Panjabyat).
58 But a second variable, the British context and particularly its multicultural framework,
tend  to  rehabilitate  these  cleavages.  While  reifying  and  institutionalizing  cultural
differences, it encourages minority groups to be internally homogenous (at the expense
of plural, overlapping or heterodox definitions of identity) and externally divided by tight
boundaries.  Besides,  Indians as a whole,  be they Sikhs or Hindus,  have for long been
adamant to differentiate themselves from Pakistanis and Bangladeshis: firstly, as part of
their process of social mobility, they want to appear as a model minority, with little in
common with deprived and marginalized migrant groups; secondly within a context of
rising islamophobia in British society, the case of Sikhs in that respect is peculiar as the
outward symbols of their faith (their turban and long beard) make the minority of those
who wear them in the diaspora14 look like radical Muslims.
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NOTES
1. I wish to thank W. Hew McLeod, Denis Matringe, Asif Khan and Aminah Mohammad-Arif for
their very helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
2. See among other works: Singh & Barrier (1999); Tatla (1999); Axel (2001).
3. His favourite target being the Nath Yogis, see McLeod (1980).
4. This subsequent development is borrowed from H. McLeod’s unsurpassed study of the Janam-
Sakhi, in Early Sikh Tradition, op.cit.
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5. A  religious  and  militant  order  created  in  1699  by  the  10 th Guru,  whose  membership  is
restricted to those who undergo baptism (armit sanskar) and wear the panj kakkar, the fives Ks,
the kirpan, kara, kesh, kanga, khacha.
6. This sanskrit word (literally ‘path’) ‘is used in India to designate groups following particular
teachers  or  doctrines’  (McLeod  2002).  Written  with  a  capital  letter,  it  refers  to  the  Sikh
community alone.
7. Published in Panjabi in 1898, it has since then been augmented, reprinted several times and
widely disseminated, but its original title in Hindi has been retained. See a review of this work by
Grewal (1997).
8. This analysis draws from Fenech (2003) and Das (1992).
9. See on this period: Banga (1988); Singh (1987); Talbot & Singh (1999); Tan & Kudaisya (2000).
10. As recovered by Butalia (1998). See also Pandey (2001).
11. This small town north of Batala is a holy town for the Ahmadiyahs. I thank Prof. McLeod for
this information.
12. See on the issue of ethnicity and gender, Westwood (1995).
13. See the most comprehensive study of the Panjabi movement in Rahman (1997).
14. A majority of Sikhs, the mona Sikhs, cut their hair and do not wear a turban though.
ABSTRACTS
This paper focuses on Sikh representations of the Muslims and the relationships between those
two groups sharing a common regional identity, both in the Sub-continent and in the diaspora. It
does so diachronically, arguing that historical constructions of the Muslim as the Other (often,
but not always, as the enemy) have been instrumental in Sikh identity formation process, since
the 18th century onwards. And synchronically, it traces the reshaping of these representations in
post-colonial Britain that is home to important Sikh and Muslim populations and the ways they
impact on inter-community relationships.
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